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SHADOW BANKING SERVICES AND ITS
IMPTICATIONS FOR THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY
ABSTRACT
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poper reviews some conceptuol ond theoreticol issues os well os
considers the implicotions of shodow bonking services in the Nlgerion
economy. lt defines shodow bonking services os 'o system of credit
intermediotion thot involves entities ond octivities outside Centrol Bonk
of Nigerio's regulotory copture'. The poper noted thot Nigerio is yet to
moke significont policy impoct on shodow bonking in spite of its inherent
systemic risk ond regulotory orbitroge concerns on the economy. ln
oddition, there is neither doto collection nor informotion monogement
fromeworks to meosure its size, performonce ond impoct on the
economy. The poper therefore, recommends the design of on
oppropriote policy fromework for shodow bonking, efficient informotion
monogement ond the keying-in into FSB's globol strotegies; ond
concludes thot o properly monoged shodow finonciol octivities could
be o veritoble tronsmission chonnel for effectlve ond efficient monetory
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TNTRODUCTION

Shodow bonking services ore

octivities reloted to credit
intermediotion, liquidity ond
moturity tronsformotion thot toke
ploce outside the reguloted
bonking system. Some finonciol
institutions ore usuolly engoged in
providing finonciol services similor
to those provided by troditionol
bonks, but those services ore not
under the supervisory purview of
the regulotory ogencies, ond
therefore, hove no occess to
centrol bonk liquidity support
when the need orises. The lock of
occess to liquidity support by these

finonciol institutions ond their
engogement in intermediotion
octivities render them very frogile
ond ore subjected to systemic risk.
Shodow bonking services ore
common, porticulorly in poor ond

emerging economies ond it hos
been in existence in Nigerio for
over two decodes. Some
institutions deliberotely engoge in
these forms of finonciol octivities
for the purpose of hiding or
conceoling importont informotion
from government in order to
ocquire excess profits, ovoid
toxes, stondords ond other legol
requirements. Their presence in
economic ond finonciol octivities
constitutes big chollenge to the
policy mokers ond regulotors. lt
olso hos o strong potentiol to
undermine ony effort in building
strong ond quolity institutions thot
could f oster growth o nd

development. ln oddilion, it
increoses uncertointy in the
economy by rendering officiol
stotistics unrelioble, thereby
creoting wrong investmenf
decision ond misleoding informed
policy decisions. lt olso presents o
strong potentiol os o mojor source
of distortions ond systemic risk
which could escolote to the entire
economy through the finonciol
system (Bernonke, 201 2).

Despite severol efforts by the
regulotory outhorities to stem its
build-up, shodow bonking services
continue to grow ropidly, ond ore
now estimoted by the Finonciol
Stobility Boord (FSB) to be oround
holf the business volume of regulor
bonks. Avoiloble doto indicoted
thot globolly. the shodow bonking
industry grew from $US5 trilllon to
obout $US75 trillion worldwide in
2013, with emerging morkets
experiencing the fostest growth
(FSB, 20 r 4).

There ore severol reosons why
policy mokers should be
concerned obout the persistent
rise in the octivities of shodow
finonciol institutions. Proper
understonding ond knowledge of
their octivities is very essentiol for
effective policy decision. lncreose
in shodow bonking services moy
erode the tox ond sociol security
bose of the economy thereby
increosing the budget deficit or tox
rote ond weoken the entire

finonciol system. Growing octivities

of shodow bonking moy ottroct

ond encouroge potronoge

of
informol octivities, thereby posing
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significont chollenge for

trodifionol bonking institutions
under regulotory supervisions.
Appropriote monitoring of
shodow bonking will help in
mitigoting the build-up of such
systemic risks ond in moking
efficient ond effective ollocotion
of resources.

However, this finoncing opprooch

hos both upside ond downside
risks. The positive port of it hos to do
with its obility to boost economic
growth of o country os it provides
occess to credit to the low income
eorners for their doy to doy
spending on goods ond services.
On the other hond, it foils to
provide necessory ond relevont
infornnotion to the low income
eorners to enoble them know ond
understond excctly the cost
implicotion for fhe services they
were provided, ond thct hos o
copocify of pushing them into
consir:nt debt trop. ln ocldition,
shodcw bonks finonclng :ttroc',
highei' interesf rotes thcn the
troditionol bonks chorge ond olso
requires ond demonds much
higher colloterol on the omount of
loons they provide.
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bonking system, develop policies
to strengthen oversight ond
regulotion of the shodow bonking
system (FSB, 2013). The FSB hos
been mcndoted to develop
strotegies to: mitigote the spill-over
effect of the shodow bonking
system; reduce the susceptibility of
money morket funds to "runs",
ossess ond olign the incentives
ossocioted with securitizotion,

dompen potentiol f inonciol
stobility risks ond pro-cyclicol
incentives ossocioted with
shodow bonklng thot moy

exocerbote funding stroins in times
of morket stress; ond ossess ond
mitigote systemic risks posed by
othershodow bonking entities ond
octivities. So for, the FSB hos
deveioped ond updoted toolbox
of meosures for promoting the
lmplementotion of stondords for
evcluoting shodow bonking
octivities thot is now opplicoble in
over sixty jurisdictions.

since shodow bonking wos widely
occloimed to be o primory foctor
in the subprime mortgoge crisis of

ln spite of the concerted efforts to

deol with the emerging globol
problem of shodow bonking
services, Nigerio is yet to moke
significont contribution towords
the development of ihis strotegy.
Currently, very little is known obout

ond the globol
thot followed, it hos

2007-2009

recession

costed shodows on Chinese

economy, threotening onother
globol recession even before the
economy wos yet to recover from
the eorlier one. Though shodow
bonking system underscores
entrepreneuriol spirit, it olso points
to deep problems in o country's
finonciol system (Songwonich,

concern for policy mokers ond
regulotors. There

is

need for urgent

ottention f rom oll relevont
stokeholders in the f inonciol
services industry to forestoll the
consequences thot inoction moy
befollon the economy.
The moin objective of this poper
therefore, is to exomine some of
the concepts ond the implicotions
of shodow bonklng services in the
Nigerion economy os o prelude to

proffering some

recommendotions

usef

on

ul

policy
the woy

2O14).

forword.

ln view of the risk ossocioted with
shodow bonking, the G20 in 2009
estoblished the Finonciol Stobility
Boord (FSB) to creote o monitoring

Following this brief introduction in
section one, section two reviews
some conceptuol ond theoreticol
literoture. Section three will
provide on overview of shodow
finonciol services in Nigerio, while

to trock finonciol
sector developments outside the

fromework

59

provides some policy
recommendotions ond
concludes the poper.

2.0

CONCEPTUAT ISSUES AND

TITERAIURE REVIEW

2.1

Definition of Terms ond
Concepluol lssues
Shodow bonking services provide

on olternotive ovenue for
inonciol intermediotion role
distinct from those performed by

f

troditionol bonks ond other
finonciol institutions ond morkets.
These services include omong
others, the hedge funds, money

morket funds, structured

investment vehicles, exchonge
troded funds, privote equity funds,
securitisotions

ond other ossets

bocked finoncing vehicles

(KPMG. 2012). Shodow bonking

o voluoble shodow bonking servlces in
borrowing olternotive for Nigerio even though its growth in
componies, but increoses risk in the economy is becoming
the finonciol system. Not too long opporent. This is o motter of

The system offers

section four x-roys the implicotions
of shodow bonking services on the
Nigerion economy. Section five

services is relotively o new
concept thot hos stirred up o
revolution in ocodemic ond policy

circles. The term coined by Poul
McCulley in 2007 reveoled thot
the growth of the shodow bonking
system "drove one of the biggest

lending booms in history. ond
collopsed into one of the most
crushing finonciol crises we've
ever seen" (McCulley, 2009).
Ascribed to finonciol innovotion
ond credit creotion, the term
spurred o wove of further studies
of the phenomenon. The

continuing divergence of
definitions of shodow bonking
services ond the difficulty of
stemming its spill-over effect hove
sustoined the debote omong

industry experts, regulotors,

ocodemio ond the civil society.
The mojor differences orising from

these plethoro of definitions
include the precise noture of
shodow bonking, the type of
entities thot should be included
under this umbrello ond why, ond
how best to monoge this ever-

growing innovotive f inonciol
intermediotion.

The debote

of whot

exoctly

shodow bonking services ore hos
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continued to reverberote
becouse o concise ond consistent
understonding of the term within
the finonciol system is centrol to

meosuring, ond oddressing its
inherent systemic risk ond

regulotory orbitroge concerns.
Unfortunotely, o cleor notion of
the term hos, so for, remoined
elusive ond hence omenoble to
multiplicity of descriptions. To stort
with, the choice of words for the
term seems to be unfortunotely
confusing (ond perhops wrong)
becouse the nome olone sounds
ominous, resonoting on unlowful
economic octivity, ond therefore
oscribing pejorotive connototions

to the bonking system
(Nesvetoilovo,2014l.

Understondobly, ot the time of
coinoge, McCulley (2009) wos
ottempting to inform the world
obout o set of finonciol institutions
thot ore complex, opoque ond
under-reported, ond whose
octivities become o benign force
of f inonciol innovotion ond
competition, tronsloting into
economic ond politicol problems.
The messoge wos intended to
roise oworeness of o plethoro of
entities'orphoned' from the visible
port of the bonking system by
complex legol ond finonciol
operotions, which hove become
obsolutely integrol to the bonking
system. but flying below the rodor
of troditionol bonking regulotion
(Nesvetoilovo, 2014). Arising from

this opporent misnomer,
reseorchers use the term
inconsistently with importont
implicotions for their policy

o criticol
onolysis of the multitude of
onolysis. Consequently,

definitions thot hove evolved over

time moy be cotegorized into

negotive ond positive

opprooches (Kobelik,

201 2)

.

The negotive opprooch typifies
the eorly literory understonding of
the term. The inference "shodow
bonking" connotes negotivity
becouse it con be good, bod, or
otherwise. Bonking sector brings
benefits, costs ond risks to the
economy (Bornett ond Rooche,

2014). Shodows, in the ordinory
sense, obscure the shopes ond
sizes of objects. Psychologicolly,
the term 'shodow bonking' points
o picture of oll sorts of neforious,
inferior, or of best, unpleosont
finonciol entities. Consequently,
literoture is replete with myriod of

conceptuol chorocterizotions,

which moy themselves be
described os 'shodowy'. Most
descriptions portroy these
f inonciol entities os rother
encrooching on the businesses of
conventionol bonks; ond os such,
depict them os competitors doing
bonking business under the
foqode of othernomes, ond trying
to boost prof its by cutting
regulotory corners (Pozsor et ol.,
2012).lt is not surprising therefore,
thot, Jeffers ond Boicu (2013)
refened to shodow bonking os o

porollel bonking system,
on emotionol,

encopsuloting

undesiroble or o negotive context.
This obstruse perception
evident in FSB ottempt

become

to clorify

thot the seemingly derogotory
misconception of the term

'shodow bonking' is not intended
to cost o pejorotive tone on the
system ond then defined it os: "the
system of credit intermediotion
thot involves entities ond octivities
outside the regulor bonking
system," (FSB, 201 l, p.l). The

perception clorificotion
notwithstonding, this definition

not devoid of connototion

is

of
some sort of illegol operotions in

corrying out core bonking

functions of credit intermediotion
through ony medium other thon o
bonk. lnherently, the term implies
o negotive undertone of being
outside the rules ond thus
undesiroble. Attempts to point the
term different from its suggestive
discernment con hordly chonge

the

impression

thot

shodow

bonking is porositic, ond perhops,
treocherous in noture.

Another drowbock of these
inouspicious definitions

is

thot, the

term seems to exclude
unreguloted octivities of

reguloted finonciol institutions
which ore perpetroted through
60

finonciol innovotions. According
to Kodres (2013), the four key
ospects of intermediotion ore
moturity tronsformotion: obtoining
short-term funds to invest in longer-

term ossets; liquidity

tronsformotion: o concept which
entoils using cosh-like liobilities to

buy horder-to-sell ossets;
leveroging: employing
techniques thot mognify the

potentiol goins (or losses) on on
investment; credit risk tronsfer:
toking the risk of o borrower's
defoult ond tronsferring it from the
originotor of the loon to onother
porty. Thus, whichever of these
intermediory processes thot is
corried out by ony finonciol entity
(bonking or nonbonking) outside
the purview of the monetory

outhority would omount to
shodow bonking octivities.
However, mony bonks ore
engoged in these processes
through off-bolonce sheet
octivities. The inodequocies
inherent in these definitions of

shodow bonking moy be
opprecioted in view of the foct
thot the FSB def initions ore
provisionol, intended to focilitote
public discussions, ond the similor
definitions from other sources ore
chorocterized by the evolving
noture of the concept.

On the positive opprooch, o
typicol definition is thot of the

Europeon Commission (2012, pp.

3-4) which defines shodow

bonking in terms of octivities ond

"o system of
intermediories, instruments,
entities:

entities or finonciol controcts
generoting o combinotion of

bonk-like functions, but outside
the regulotory perimeter or under
o regulotory regime which is either
light or oddresses issues other thon

systemic risks, ond without

guoronteed occess to centrol
bonk liquidity focility or public
sector credit guorontees". ln
relotive terms, this definition
oppeors to be o more detoiled
description which conjures less
operotionol impropriety on the
notion.

lts shortfoll,

however, is thot
deport from

in spite of the effort to

OCTOBER - DECEMBER, 20I5
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the opporent lock of enthusiosm

exhibited by the negotive
opprooch, the omorphous noture
of shodow bonking in proctice

controdicts ony simple
imoginotion. ln theory, the sector

is

conciseness. Even though this moy

i) Loon Originotion: this process

lorge

includes ollthe steps from toking o
loon opplicotion up to disbursolof

be difficult given the

differences

in shodow bonking

octivities ocross the globe, recent
definitions oppeorto be norrowing
these discreponcies. For exomple,

funds (or declining the
opplicotion). The loon originotor
moy hold thot loon for o brief

of
morkets ond institutions thot moy

Volckx (2O14) defines whot
constitutes shodow bonking
bosed on "octivity" concept of

period of time before securitizing
ond selling off the loon to other

economies.

non-troditionol (noncore) bonking
thus: "finoncing of bonks ond
non-bonk finonciol institutions
through non-core liobilities". This

unreguloted

for instonce, the loon originotor is
the primory morket deoler for the
mortgoge, ond remoins so even if
the mortgoge is sold on the
secondorymorket.

bonking octivities undertoking by
ony finonciol entity. ln o further

ii) Loon Worehousing: this refers to

on extremely diverse group

hordly be cleorly identified,
especiolly in developing

ln Nigerio, for instonce, most of
these orgonizotions moy include
registered ond unregistered thrift
ond cooperotive societies ond
fringe operotors in the informol
money morket, which on
oggregote, would occount for o
substontiol volume of tronsoctions,

relotive to the economy.

Ostensibly, these entities hove
some sort of relotionships with
conventionol bonks in the course
of their tronsoctions. Therefore,
mere listing moy be devoid of
universol occeptobility due to
jurisdictionol voriotions. lt is olso
importont to note thot the noture

of finonciol products

ond
techniques hove become so
dynomic thot ony list moy quickly
becomeobsolete.

An ideol definition should

be
devoid of. or of leost minimize oll
identif ied def iciencies thot
impede the copture of reolity of
the object being described. The

shift towords this direction
becoming eminent

in

is

the evolving

definitionol development of
hitherto on opporently ill-defined
shodow bonking system. ln recent
definitions, the concept "covers
oll finonciol intermediory octivities

(credit risk tronsfer, moturity
tronsformotion ond/or liquidity
ond leveroge) operoting outside
the regulotory fromework of
bonking octivities, ond therefore
not subject to the constroints nor
covered by guorontees offered to
the bonks, but exposed to o mojor
liquidity risk" (Fimorkets.com,
2O14). This definition embroces

unreguloted octivities of
reguloted finonciol

institutions.
However, the ottempt to moke it
oll encompossing limits its

incorporotes

oll

refinement, Bonk Negoro

Moloysio (BNM), the Centrol Bonk
of Moloysio, defines shodow
bonking os o 'system of credit

intermediotion thot involves
entities ond octivities outside
BNM's regulotory copture' (Forid,

2012). By this definition, the
Moloysion shodow bonking
system comprises non-bonk
entities thot engoge in: loon
originotion; purchose of debt
securities; securitizotion; credit
guorontee or enhoncement
exercises; ond credit roting or
scoring octivities. This definition
moy be considered os on
improvement over the previous
ones. Aport from its seeming

simplicity, completeness,
conciseness ond lotent

consistency, this definition moy be

odopted, ond odopted in ony
economy with relotive eose. The
definition implies thot octivities
reloting to shodow bonking must
tronslote into identifying specific
entities or morket segments for
purposes of ossessment, toking
into occount the peculiorities of
the economy. The definition
should be odopted ond locolized

investors. ln mortgoge sub-sector

the extension of o credit line by o
finonciol institution to o loon

originotor

to fund

specified

focilities thot o borrower initiolly
used to buy o property. lt is o short-

term revolving credit focility

extended by o finonciol institution
originotor for the
ocquisition (or "worehousing") of
corporote loons to focilitote the
process, whether directly or
through securitizotion. This is done,

to o loon

for instonce, between

cooperotive societies ond
commerciol ond/or mortgoge
bonks. The selection of o

worehouse lender for o porticulor
loon moy vory bosed on the types
of loon products ollowed by the
worehouse provider, ond rotes for
vorious types of loons products or
investors in the loon opproved by
theworehouse lenderto be on the

line of credit. Worehousing is

for the Nigerion situotion.

becoming increosingly common
in the Nigerion money morket os
troditionol worehouse focilities
continue to offer monogers tools
to oggregote eligible mortgoge
ond movoble property loons over
o set period of time. Alternotive
finoncing methods ond sources
continue to evolve, including

Bokk-Simon et ol. (2012) identified

morket volue risk.

shodow bonks ond the bonking

iii) ABS lssuonce: An ABS is

those thot mitigote potentiol

interconnections between

system to include the following six-

step choin consisting of (l) loon
originotion, (2) loonworehousing,
(3) osset-bosed securities (ABS)
issuonce, (4) ABS worehousing, ((5)

ABS intermediotion
wholesole funding.

6l

ond

(6)

o
security whose income poyments

ond volue is derived from, ond
colloterolized (or "bocked") by o
specified pool of underlying
ossets. The pool of ossets is
typicolly o group of smoll ond
illiquid ossets which ore unoble to

Volume 39 No 4
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be sold individuolly. Pooling the
ossets into finonciol instruments
ollows them to be sold to generol
investors, ond ollows the risk of
investing in the underlying ossets to

originotor for the funding of
securitizes ossets, such os outo
loon. Worehouse lines of credit
ploy on importont role in moking

diversified becouse eoch
security represents o froction of
the totolvolue of the diverse pool
of underlying ossets. The pools of
underlying ossets con include
common poyments from credit
cords, outo loons ond mortgoge
loons to esoteric cosh flows from
oircroft leoses, royolty poyments

speciol purpose ossets loon

governmentol ogencies ond
foreign businesses. The money is
lent to bonks on o short-term bosis
with outomotic rollovers, unless
the lender osks for the cosh to be

morket more occessible to buyers
since mony loon originotors would

returned. Wholesole lenders eorn
some interest on their cosh while

be

ond movie revenues.
Often o seporote institution colled
speciolpurpose vehicle is creoted
to hondle the securitizotion of
osset bocked securities. The
speciol purpose vehicle, which
creotes ond sells the securities,
uses the proceeds of the sole to
poy bock the bonk thot creoted,

or originoted the

underlying

ossets. As long os the credit risk of

the underlying ossets

is

not be oble to ottroct sufficient
omount of deposits thot ore
necessory to fund the loons by
themselves. Therefore, worehouse
funding ollows the loon originotors

to provide loons of

more

competitive rotes. Unlike in other
types of lending, loon originotors
eorn more profit from originotion
fees thon interest rote spreod
since the closed mortgoge loon is
sold quicklyto on investor.

v)

ABS lntermediotion: Assetbocked securities (ABS) ore bonds
or notes bocked by finonciol
ossets. Typicolly, these ossets
consist of receivobles other thon
mortgoge loons, such os credit

keeping it liquid ond the
borrowing bonks con lend the
money out of o higher rote of

interest, thus generoting profits.
With wholesole funding, o bonk
mokes os ovoiloble mony loons os
it con without worrying obout the
omount of money it hos on
deposit. The interest poid on the
short-term borrowing will be low
compored to the interest eorned
by the bonk on loons. The donger
is thot wholesole lenders con pull
bock their funds ot o short notice;
ond if thot hoppens ocross the
finonciol system, it could couse
serious finonciol problems for the
bonking industry.

tronsferred

cord receivobles, outo loons,

The list is not exhoustive; it is only o

the

monufoctured-housing controcts
ond home-equity loons. An ossetbocked security (ABS) is o security
bocked by the cosh flows of o
poolof ossets. Home equity loons,

reflection of the solient
intermediotion chonnels thot ore
commonly employed by shodow
bonking in odvonced economies.

receivobles

ond student loons
commonly bock this closs of

Shodow Bonking ond Regulor

securities. However, neorly ony
cosh-producing situotion con be
securitized. For investors, ossetbocked securities ore on
olternotive to investing in
corporotedebt.

At this juncture, it is importont to
consider the extent of shodow

to onother institution,

originoting bonk removes the
volue of the underlying ossets from
its bolonce sheet, ond receives
cosh in return os the osset bocked
securities ore sold. This tronsoction
con improve its credit roting ond
reduce the omount of copitol thot
it needs. ln this cose, the credit

roting of the osset bocked

securities would be bosed only on

the ossets ond liobilities of the

speciol purpose vehicle, ond this
roting could be higher if the
originoting bonk issued the
securities becouse the risk of the
osset bocked securities would no
longer be ossocioted with other
risks thot the originoting bonk
might beor. A higher credit roting
could ollow the speciol purpose
vehicle, ond by extension, the
originoting institution to poy o
lower interest rote (hence chorge

o

higher price) on the ossetbocked securities thon if the
originoting institution borrowed
funds, orissued bonds.

iv) ABS Worehousing: ABS
worehouse is o short-term
revolving credit focility extended
by o finonciol institution to o loon

outo loons, credit cord

vi) Wholesole funding: Wholesole
funding is o method thot bonks use
in oddition to core demond
deposits to finonce operotions,
ond monoge risk. Bonks
troditionolly rely on customers
deposits to provide money thot
they con lend to borrowers.
Through wholesole funding, o
bonk borrows odditionol funds it
con use to grow the lending
business obove the level of
deposits, ond increose interest
eornings. Wholesole finoncing
ollows bonks to borrow money
from o ronge of sources, including
other finonciol institutions, nonfinonce-reloted corporotions.
62

2.2

lnterconneclions between

Bonking Syslems

bonking's involvement in bonking

octivities. Thot is, credit
intermediotion, moturity
tronsformotion, liquidity ond credit
tronsformotion. Shodow bonking
octivities ond the regulor bonking
system ore highly interreloted

through o complex web of

interconnections (Turner, 2012).
Theoreticolly, shodow bonking

could exist os o stondolone system
porollel to, but quite seporote
f rom troditionol bonking. ln

proctice however, it is not
something porollel to ond
seporote from the core bonking
system. There ore rother complex

interconnections thot link the two.

Shodow

bonks

ore

interconnected olong o verticolly
integroted long intermediotion
choin with interploying forces
within the credit intermediotion
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processes through o wide ronge of

securitizotion, ond secured
funding techniques, such os osset-

bocked securities

(ABS),

colloterolized debt obligotions,
ond repo (Pozsoret ol 201 0).

The mechonism of shodow
bonking is rother simple. A
finonciol institution lends money to
ossets such os mortgoge, generol
consumer ond outo loons, ond

then works with investment
bonkers to securitize these pools of
ossets. These securities ore then
sold to o vorieiy of investors such

os pension funds, endowments,
mutuol funds, hedge funds ond
other finonciol institutions. These
instruments could toke o number
of forms which moke up the
tronsmission chonnels between
shodow ond regulor bonks.
Commerciol bonks ore often port
of the shodow bonking choin by

providing explicit or implicit
support to the shodow bonking
entities thus creoting ovenue for
moturity/liquidity tronsformotion.
Also, bonks often invest in finonciol

products

of shodow

coses, investment (Welitzkin.
2014).lt hos olso been shown thot

shodow bonking's growth

is

ossocioted with GDP growth, low
interestrotes ond lowterm spreods
(inducing seorch for yield), bonk

copitol stringency (copturing

regulotory circumvention) ond
institutionol
investors. After considerotion of

with growth of

these foctors, there olso oppeors

to be some

f

orm of

complementority with the size of
the bonking sector (Gelos ond
Volckx, 2014). lt is importont to
note thot, some of these processes
ore olien to the Nigerion finonciol
system, or ore still in their infoncy

stoge with little or

no
mocroeconomic significonce,

except the circumstonces of their
emergence ond growth potentiol
for now. Thus, the operotions of
shodow bonking in odvonced
economies ore substontlolly
different from whot is obtoinoble in
Nigerio of the moment. Our
shodow bonks ore relotively

underdeveloped, ond the

interconnections

with

bonks

conventionol bonks ore rother

olongside other providers of funds,
such os consumers ond businesses
(Gosh et ol. 2012). Bonks ond
shodow bonking entities olso
invest in eoch other's finonciol
instruments, giving rise to funding

weok. This is porticulorly so with the
obrogotion of universol bonking in
the system which hod hitherto
been the driving force behind
shodow bonking system, ond its

osset holdings, ond derivotive

foilure or finonciol stress would

positions even where there is no

couse such severe disruption in the

strong link to conventionol
inter-dependencies ond bonking system. No shodow bonk
vulnerobilities, ond ore often entity is sufficiently lorge,
exposed to common leveroged, complex or so
concentrotions of risk through intricotely interconnected thot its
cleor direct connection

(FSB,

2012).

Nigerion economy of the
moment. However, these
powerful bonks - nonbonk linkoges

Shodow bonks, individuolly or
collectively, ore not systemicolly
importont ond con be seen os
complementory to overoll morket
liquidity os opposed to o
destobilizing element of the
finonciol system (AIMA, 2012). Ihe
processes described obove only
imply extreme sophisticotion of

shodow bonking. Shodow
bonking represents progress on
the development of the finonciol

system by

of

f

ering onother

ovenue for finoncing, ond in some

con exocerbote the procyclicol
buildup of leveroge involved
"flowed credit risk tronsfers"
through securitizotion ond
heighten risks of osset bubbles,
especiolly when both systems

the risk it portends to the system.

This mokes it imperotive for the
monetory outhorities to design on
oppropriote fromework in order to

collect doto ond monoge

informotion on the exposures ond
funding dependencies of the
mojor bonks to non-bonk finonciol
sectors, os well os the individuol
moteriol positions. Thot should
ideolly be complemented by
collecting informotion on the

exposures ond funding
dependencies of relevont

shodow bonking entities to, ond
on their moteriol counterporties.

When monoged properly,
shodow bonks' liquidity ond

moturity profiles os well os their
leveroge ore such thot they do
not pose significont risks to the
finonciol system (AIMA, 2012). lt is
worth noting thot before the 20072009 globol finonciol crises,

shodow bonking hod been in
existence. Historicolly, shodow

bonking is on oge-long

phenomenon (Lozcono, 2013)
doting bock os eorlier thon 1763
(Quinn & Roberds, 2013) in the
USA,

ond Europe.

ln Nigerio, non-bonk credit
intermediories hove o

complementory role to bonks in
providing finonciol services to
specific morket segments. The
noture ond scole of their octivities
ore however considerobly less
complex ond occount for o much
smoller shore of totol credit
intermedioted by the bonking
system compored to whot is

observed in some odvonced
economies during the globol
finonciol crisis. However, there is
deorth of informotion with the
consequent gops moking the
oscertoinment of shodow
bonking in the economy olmost
impossible in Nigerio. ln view of
systemic ond regulotory orbitroge

invest in the some ossets (Ghosh et
ol., 2012). Thus, ond in coses where

concerns, the dire need for
effective doto collection ond
informotion monogement hos

common concentrotions.

ond monitoring the

there is no direct connection,
bonks con be exposed to
The lorger the size of the shodow

bonking entity/octivity, the lorger
63

become imperotive for mopping
shodow
bonking system in the economy
through o combinotion of
quontitotive ond quolitotive
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informotion from both mocro

(system wide) ond micro
(e ntity I octivity-bosed )

perspectives.

2.3

finonciol crisis to these sectors ond
monitor future developments.

Schworcz (2013) showed thot
shodow bonking

Lilerolure Review

There ore quite o number of
existing literotures thot provide
useful insight on severol foctors
responsible for the emergence
ond rise of shodow bonking, ond
its implicotions on the economy

over the post decodes.

For

instonce, Duco 2014 opines thot,
risk ond other foctors necessitote
the use of short-term funding
provided by the shodow bonking
system since the eorly 1960s os
olternotive to bonk loons. The
study indicoted thot. the effect of
regulotory provisions on bonks ond
non-bonk finonciol institutions ond
finonciol innovotions porticulorly in
2009 ond 2010 ployed o vitol role in
oddition to chonge in informotion

ond increose in

reserves

is

growing ropidly

in o number of

developing

countries including Chino. ond it is
estimoted to be oround 20 trillion

Yuon (which is opproximotely o
third the size of Chino's bonklending morket). The shodow
bonking sector in these countries

is

typicolly weokly reguloted, yet,
the growth of the sector is thought
to pose risks to finonciol stobility.
He concluded, thot odditionol
regulotion moy be needed to

strike o bolonce between

reducing thot risk ond preserving
shodow bonking os on importont
chonnel of olternotive funding to

developing economies,
porticulorly in the foce of

significont retrenchment by lorge
bonks thot hod dominoted the
creditsupply.

requirement.

Adrino ond Shine
mointoined thot, the

Luck ond Schempp (2014) using

(2009)
- 2009

2OO7

globol finonciol crises

hos
highlighted the chonging role of
finonciol institutions, ond the
growing importonce of "shodow
bonking system" thot grew on the
bock of the securitizotion of ossets
ond integrotion of bonking with
copitol morket developments. This
trend hos been most pronounced
in the United Stotes of Americo,
ond hos hod o profound influence
on the globolfinonciolsystem os o
whole.
Dovies (2OO9) pointed out thot,
recent events in 2007-2009 hove
hod o significont impoct on the
bolonce sheets of finonciol
corporotions ond privote nonfinonciol corporotions. The study
f ocuses on identif ying ond
meosuring cunent omissions from
these bolonce sheets, including
octivities f rom the shodow
bonking system such os hedge
f unds, structured investment
vehicles ond privote equities. The
oim is to improve tronsporency
ond moke it eosier to onolyze the

tronsmission

of the current

bonking model moturity

tronsformotion in which regulotory
orbitroge induces co-existence of
reguloted commerciol bonks ond
unreguloted shodow bonks, found
out thot relotive ossets size of the

shodow bonking sector
determines the stobility of the

finonciol system. But if reguloted
commerciol bonks themselves
engoge in shodow bonking, this
meons thot o lorger shodow
bonking sector is sustoinoble; ond
thot in the presence of regulotory
orbitroge, sofety net for bonks
moy foil to prevent o bonking crisis.

3.0

OVERVIEW

OF

SHADOW

BANKING IN NIGERIA

The octivities of whot could be
regorded os shodow finonciol
services in Nigerio hove o very
long historicol origin (Ekpo ond
Umoh, 2O14). Severol finonciol
institutions operote in the Nigerion
money morket. ond could possibly
be engoging in shodow bonking
octivities. These include: merchont
bonks, discount houses. finonce

componies, pension funds

odministrotors, funds
64

ond

ossets

monogers, primory mortgoge
institutions, microfinonce bonks,
prof it-shoring f unds, sovings

bonks, ond thrift ond credit
society, omong others. Their
octivities ore unreguloted, ond
some of them operote under
written lows, or in forms of ooth or
mutuol trust omong themselves.
While these entities ore duly
registered ond their operotions
sonctioned by lows of the lond,
others operote os unregistered
entities in forms of ooth ond
mutuol trust omong themselves.

The lotter moy include: 'esusu'
which is mostly procticed in the
southern oreo, 'isusu or utu' in
eostern stotes ond 'odoshe'
omong the northern people of
Nigerio. These forms of finonciol

services require fixed contributions

omong members ond the benefit
goes to the contributors on
rototionol bosis. Not only do they
serve os cotolysts in the morket.
they ore on their own lorge-scole
investors in the money morket os
well os operotors in Nigerion
finonciol services industry. The
guidelines for primory deolership
in money morket instruments of
the Centrol Bonk of Nigerio ollow
primory deolers to submit multiple
bids for their occounts, ond on
beholf of their customers. This
tronslotes thot CBN is owore of,
ond recognises the bonkond nonbonk interconnections.
Another form of shodow finonciol

in Nigerio includes
informol money lenders, sovings
ond credit ossociotions ond credit
unions. This form of finonciol
services ottrocts very high interest
rotes. On the other hond, money
services

lenders ond sovings/credit
ossociotions corry out their
finonciol services in o more
formolized monner when
compored with other unreguloted
finonciol services. However, these
institutions moy or moy not be
registered under ony legislotion,
but most of the sovings ond credit
cooperotives must be registered

under the Co-operotive

Associotion Act. Credit societies
often come together to form
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lorger units colled credit unions,
when they modify their operotions
to include subscription of shore

copitol, deposit-toking ond

mony of them engoge in services

thot ore very difficult to detect.
Consequently, divergent opinions

exist obout the estimotion,
procedure ond methodologies

ploce by mony regulotors oround
the world to controlthe spreod of
their octivities using vorious
methods ond meosures, yet, no
significont success wos recorded
os these requires the odoption of
strotegic tox reform ond sociol

lending. Credit Unions ore the
precursors of the defunct People's
Bonk of Nigerio. (Ekpo ond Umoh,

ond its opplicobility in economic

20141.

onolysis, ond policy purposes. The

security systems thot could

of shodow bonking in
Nigerio got primocy when

composition ond size of shodow
bonking vories ocross countries.
However, some similorities olso

improve the dynomics of the
officiol economy (Schender ond
Enste, 2000).

obtoined from Finonciol Stobility
Boord (FSB) estimoted globol size

EFInA (2014) report (see Toble l)
showed thot obout 35.0 per cent
of the odult populotion is involved
in shodow bonking in Nigerio.
Though this figure is high, the

The rise

finonciol entities reolized thot their
obility to generote loon ond moke
profit is limited by occess to copitol
ond size of their bolonce sheet. As
o result of thot, bonks begin to
speciolize in creoting loons,

pockoging them ond then

chonnel them to other interested

investors in the form of
securitizotion through investment
bonks. This brought obout the
inception of the unreguloted
"shodow bonking system" which
provided o conduit for copitol

seeking

to purchose these

securities. Most finonciol

used in obtoining such estimotes

exist. Avoiloble informotion
of shodow bonking ot $60 trillion in
2010 ond $57 trillion in 201L The
composition of globol size vories
ocross countries ond regions. For
instonce in 201 l, the United Stotes
of Americo occounted for US$23
trillion, the Euro oreo US$22 trillion

ond the UK occounted for US$9
trillion (FSB,20ll). According to
Deloitte, the size of the US shodow
bonking sector wos estimoted to
be oround US$10 to US$60 trillion
(Deloitte, 2012).

institutions in colloborotion with
investment bonks securitized their
ovoiloble pools of ossets ond

Currently, there ore strong
indicotions thot octivities of

consumer loons, including outo
loons. These securities would then
be sold to o voriety of investors

shodow finonciol institutions ore
doily increosing ond these oppeor
to be dworfing troditionol bonk
octivities. Efforts hove been put in

provide home ond generol

such os pension funds,

endowments, mutuol funds,
hedge funds ond other finonciol
institutions. These instruments
could toke the forms of ossetbocked securities (ABS),
colloterolized debt obligotions

(CDO). mortgoge-bocked

securities (MBS) ond colloterolized
loon obligotions (CLO). lt is through

these instruments thot more

lenders hove eosy occess to credit
from finonciol institutions.

3.1 Size ond

Functions of

Shodow Finonciol lnstitulions

Obtoining relioble ond occurote
stotistics of the size of shodow
finonciol institutions is cruciol,
porticulorly for effective ond
informed investment ond policy
decisions. However, determining
the size, mognitude, performonce

ond composition

of

informol/shodow finonciol

institutions is very chollenging os

omount involved moy be

relotively smoll becouse, this
segment of populotion comprises
borrowers in the middle ond
lower-income groups who usuolly
reoch out for non-bonk credit
providers.
It is importont therefore, thot the
CBN comes up with oppropriote
modolities thot would culminote
into o functionol fromework to
enhonce doto collection ond
informotion monogement of this
fost-growing finonciol sub-sector.

This is in line with
recommendotions of the

lfable 1: Llptake of Financial Prodtrcts/Senrices
Adalrs (million)
Total adult population
93-5
Forrnal sarrings products
29.8
Deposit rnoney bank accotrnts
25.9
Inforrnal sawings rnechanisrns
2O-7
Pension
5
Coopetatiwe rnernbership
3.4
Shares
3.3
Inforrnal loans
3.7
Forrnal loan products
2.a
Mictofinance bank accolrnts
2.6
Insurance
Mobile rnoney serwices
O.8
O.4
Non-interest banking accounts
1,

Mortages

O.2

Sorrrce: EFInA Access to Financial Serwlces in Nigeria 2O14 survey
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Finonciol Feosibility Boord for
effective jurisdictionol ond globol
monogement of shodow bonking
os o woy of stemming its potentiol

credit, this serves to stobilize
mocroeconomic flow of funds
while of the some time ollowing
risks to be diversified outside the

risks.

commerciol bonking (Deutsche

4.0

Bundesbonk,

201 4

p.23).

THE IMPLICATIONS OI

SHADOW FINANCIAL SERVICES ON
NIGERIAN ECONOMY

4.1 Benefils of Shodow
Bonking

Finonciol intermediotion through
other chonnels outside the
reguloted bonking system hos
some importont benefits to the
growth of the reol sector of the
economy. Shodow bonking is o
high-yield lending business outside

normol bonk chonnels thot

provides credit to borrowers thot
do not meet normol bonk criterio.
By offering higher returns, shodow
bonks roise money from businesses
ond individuols frustroted by the
low cop the centrol bonks imposes
for interest rotes on bonk deposits.
They lend to firms thot ore unoble
to borrow from bonks moy be
becouse they ore in risky industries,
especiolly, the reol sector where
regulor bonks try to curb lending
due to perceived high risk. Much
of the shodow bonking focilities go
to smollond medium enterprises in
mojor cities which do not hove
londed properties for colloterol,
ond smoller Nigerion cities where
bonks do occept londed property

thot is predominontly used

os

colloterol is hordly occepted by

conventionol bonks. lt is olso
helpful to the households
presenting onother investment
opportunity which is importont
becouse of the ceiling on deposit
interest rotes.

Generolly, speciolizotion

in

the
shodow bonking system focilitotes
o more efficient reconciliotion of
finoncing needs ond the provision
of funds. From this perspective,

shodow bonks contribute

immensely to the finonciol system

ond non-finonciol sector in terms
of improved investment ond
finoncing. lf the conventionol
bonking system encounters short_
lived botflenecks in ihe supply of

There ore mony other benefits in o

vioble ond

well-f unctioning
shodow bonking system. lt is
modern, sophisticoted ond o

complementory woy to shore risks
efficiently (Hokkoroinen, 201 4). lt is
olso on olternotive woy to ollocote
resources in on economy outside
the regulor bonking sector upon
which ony developing economy,

like Nigerio, is porticulorly
dependent. The shodow bonking
system moy produce the some

economic benefits os the
troditionol bonking system, often
times, with less risk (Mocey,2012).
Evidenlly, shodow bonking morket
hos good potentiol in unlocking
the economy's credit morket by
offering o vioble complementory
funding source for the reol
economy, in porticulor, for the

smoll ond medium enterprises
(SMEs)

sector ( Hokkoroine n, 2O1 4).

An empiricol study by Aribobo
(2013) concludes thot, in generol.

Cooperotive Thrift ond Credit
Societies hove o positive impoct
on the growth ond development
of smoll-scole businesses in
Nigerio.

monitoring ond be on instrument

in building trust. These entities

compete independently

by
prudently monoging their offoirs
ond mointoining sufficient buffers
to eorn the trust of investors ond
counterports on their own merits.
As long os investors understond
whot is going on ond such
octivities do not pose undue risk to
the finonciol system. there is
nothing inherently shodowy obout
obtoining funds from vorious
investors who might wont their
money bock within o short period
ond investing those funds in ossets

with longer-term

moturities

(Kodres, 2013).

From monetory policy

perspective, increosed shodow
bonking octivities olso implies thot

morket-bosed voriobles,

in
porticulor, osset prices ore ploying

o more centrol role in

the

monetory policy tronsmission

process, thereby increosing the
effectiveness of monetory policy
meosures. Thus, it is not necessorily
o foregone conclusion thot the
increosed importonce of shodow
bonks weokens the effectiveness
of monetory policy; it moy only
chonge the relotive importonce

of individuol tronsmission
chonnels.

4.2

lnherent Risks in Shodow

Bonking Syslem

Oftentimes. some economies ore

too dependent on regulor bonks
(ESRB , 2014): thus moking
olternotive funding chonnels
which con further support
sustoinoble growth in the reol
economy imperotive. ln Nigerio,
for instonce, the conventionol
bonklng system con hordly cope
effectively with the diverse noture
of our economy. The formol sector
hos been unoble to meet the
finoncing needs of the fost
growing SMEs in the reolsector. As
o consequence, shodow bonking
is spreoding to fiil the gop of lock of
occess to funds by businesses from
conventionol bonks. However,

oppropriote disclosure of

informotion ond tronsporency of
operotions will enhonce efficjent
66

Finonciol intermediories such os
shodow bonks stond os o source
of systemic risk, especiolly on the

event thot they colloborote
strongly with

the

troditionol

bonking octivities to perform their

functions (e.9. moturity ond
liquidity tronsformotion, ond
leveroge). The existence of
shodow finonciol services in ony
economy hos on odverse effect,
porticulorly on the reol sector of
the economy.
Shodow bonking is susceptible to
sy-stemic ond regulotory risks

(FSB,

2011). Systemic concerns
predominonfly orise from octivities
thot generote moturity ond/or

liquidity tronsformotion, which
involve flowed credit risk tronsfer
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ond creote or focilitote leveroge.
This roises systemic concerns for
outhorities becouse of the risk thot
short-term deposit-like funding in
the shodow bonking system con
creote "modern bonk-run; the
leveroge built up within the
shodow bonking system con olso
omplify procyclicolity; ond the

shodow bonking system's
interconnectedness with the

regulor bonking system con roise
systemic concerns if undertoken
on o sufficiently lorge scole.
Structurolly therefore, the industry
foces possible credit risk, moturity
mismotch, liquidity problems. ond
other fundomentol problems of
finonciol intermediotion (Murphy,
2013). When so mony investors
withdrow or would not roll over
(reinvest) their funds, bonks ond
nonbonks run into serious difficulty.
ln oddition, regulotory orbitroge

countries for instonce. some of the
smollshodow bonking entities ore
not wotched closely enough to
deter them from possible tox
evosion, or even ovoidonce.

5.0

20I5

POUCY

RECOMMENDAIIONS AND
CONCTUSION

5.1

Policy Recommendotions

ond Woy Forword

Shodow finonciol services con

hove on odverse effect

on

From on economic perspective.

the essence of the

monetory policy tronsmission

finonciol
provide the nonfinonciol sector with suitoble
options for finoncing ond
ocquiring finonciol ossets. This
intermediory role is increosingly

functioning money ond copitol
morkets. The quolity ond sofety of
privote ossets. its supply ond stock
ond the velocity of colloterol con

being toking over by the shodow
bonking system whose octivities
ore structured outside the regulor
bonking system. The system does
exist in the shodows, owoy from

monetory policy tronsmission os itis

likely to hove significont

interoction with the monetory
policy. The brooder chonnel of

depends solely on well-

system is

to

offect monetory policy the spotlight of

tronsmission with mocroeconomic

consequences. Oftentimes. the
emphosis of risks orising from
shodow bonking overlooks the risk

regulotion

os

espoused in severol quorters; it is
however, o legol proctice ond
serves useful function in bridging
the deficit, ond surplus units when

from o monetory policy the formol bonking industry is
stondpoint. Very importontly, the unoble, or unwilling to provide the
Shodow bonking octivities con be provision of bonk-like services by f unds. lt should rother be
used to circumvent ond shodow bonking entities or occorded the term
concerns ore olso prevolent.

This is likely

undermine the bonking system.
to creote opportunities

greoter interoction between
shodow bonks ond commerciol

effective with speciol purpose
vehicles. This wos the biggest

risk is thot increosed shodow

for orbitroge thot might bonks moy imply on incomplete or
undermine bonking regulotion, distorted representotion of
ond leod to o build-up of monetory ond credit supply,
odditionolleveroge ond risks in the which is relevont for ossessing
system. These risks tend to be more
economic octivity ond
problem with universol bonking in
Nigerio when systemic risk mode
the system so vulneroble. The
impoct of this risk hos been less felt
in the system since the obrogotion
of universol bonking in the country.
Generolly. octivities of shodow
bonks ond other shodow finonciol
institutions ore difficult to control.
When regulotors try to tighten the
screws on the type of o porticulor
shodow bonk, money flows to

other less closely wotched

intermediories. There is regulotory

concern olso with toxotion,
especiolly in developing
economies. Emergent consensus
in ocodemic ond policy circles is
thot, shodow bonking is the
outcome of regulotory orbitroge
in the bonking sector, focilitoted
by notionol tox, occounting ond
bonking rules (Nesvetoilovo,

2014o).

ln mony developing

developments in goods prices. The

bonking octivity could reduce the
informotion content of monetory
indicotors such thot doto on
monetory oggregotes con hordly
be sufficiently meoningful ond

moy weoken tronsmission of
monetory policy meosures vio

commerciol bonks (Deutsche,
2014).

Also. shodow bonking hos
,implicotion for government

revenue os they evode tox ond
often foil to contribute to sociol
security thereby reducing the
omount of revenue thot goes to
government treosury. Shodow
finonciol services industry finds it
difficult to bonow from troditionol

bonks ond other finonciol
ond this limits their
productive copocity in the

institutions
economy.

'unconventionol bonking system'
for not operoting within the
moinstreom of the bonking
regulotion. lt hos become on
integrol port of the economy, o
veritoble source of funds for oll
kinds of firms ond individuols who
connot get support from the
moinstreom bonks.

ln order not to be overwhelmed
by its benefits to the economy, it is

to note the potentiol
buildup of systemic risk inherent in
shodow bonking. The foilure of o
shodow bonking entity moy hove
contogious effect on regulor
bonking sector. Thus, there is
importont

urgent need to develop

modolities to integrote shodow
bonking into the formol bonking
services so os to effectively
regulote, ond supervise them. This
is imperotive in view of the foct

thot, o combinotion of
dependence on excessive
leveroge, generolly poor

weoknesses

in regulotory

oversight is likely to creote on
environment in which o powerful,
self-reinforcing ponic could begin
(Bernonke,2009b).
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Considering its importonce to the

of the economy, policy
bureoucrot should oim ot
ollevioting the risks of shodow
bonking without depriving
businessmen of the cosh they
growth

require. Specificolly, regulotors
should explore the most proper

woy of supervision thot could
control risks in shodow bonking
while still enhoncing finonciol
services to the weokest sectors,
such os smollfirms in the reolsector.

A criticol exominotion hos shown
thot "shodow bonking is not o

poronormol development of the
economy or on outcome of
bonkers' misguided behovior. lt is
rother on infrostructure of finonciol
innovotion. Without shodow
bonking, finonce connot function;
ond thot is why shodow bonking,
however defined, is here to stoy!"
(Nesvetoilov o, 201 4b).

Nigerion monetory outhorities to
FSB strotegies, ond ovoil
itself with the updoted toolbox of
meosures for promoting the
implementotion of stondords for
key in into

evoluoting shodow bonking

5.2

octivities thot is now opplicoble in
over sixty jurisdictions. The
experience of the 2007-2009 globol
finonciol recessions hos shown thot
no economy is sof e on o
stondolone bosis. These meosures
ore germone to meosuring ond
oddressing the inherent systemic

Shodow bonking hos ignited the
most heoted debote in the world
of finonce in recent times leoding
to globol concerted efforts to
control its inherent risk, while
promoting its octivities for finonciol
stobility ond economic growth.
Unfortunotely, Nigerio is yet to be

concerns in the economy.

economic phenomenon thot is o
double edged sword thot con
moke or mor on economy. This
study exomines the concept ond
implicotions of shodow bonking in
the Nigerion economy. Though
there is no known serious threot of
the risk ossocioted with shodow
bonking presently, there is neither
ovoiloble doto nor informotion
monogement fromework to
meosure its impocts on the
economy. This study therefore,
suggests o working definition os o
prelude to further octions ond
recommends to be odopted os o

risk, ond regulotory orbitroge

Going forword, CBN moy odopt
the Centrol Bonk of Moloysio's
definition os: 'Shodow bonking is o
system of credit intermediotion
thot involves entities ond octivities
outside Centrol Bonk of Nigerio's
regulotory copture' os o
preliminory bosis for further octions.

However, given the experience of

foiled ottempts to effectively

regulote ond supervise the shodow

bonking system in other

jurisdictions, the Nigerion cose
might be porticulorly chollenging.
A better option might be to moke
sure they hove the right incentives
to do their businesses well ond
volunteer informotion. lt is desiroble

to moke regulotion such thot
restricts neither the supply nor the

demond side of the shodow

When monoged properly, shodow

bonks' liquidity ond moturity

profiles, os well os their leveroge
ore such thot they do not pose

significont risks to the finonciol
system, porticulorly in the oreo of
effectiveness of the monetory
policies, os it moy chonge the
relotive importonce of individuol
tronsmission chonnels ond increose

the effectiveness of

monetory
policy meosures in on economy.

bonking morket.

Presently, the sophisticotion of
shodow bonking is yet to be fully
developed ond its emerging risk
impoct on the Nigerion economy
seems to be weokened with the
obrogotion of universol bonking.
The risk shodow bonking portends
to the system is dependent lorgely
on the size of entities ond their

supervision ond monitoring

At present, there is
opporent deorth of doto on

institutions must disclose relevont
ond necessory informotion obout

shodow bonking system in Nigerio.
This mokes it imperotive for the
monetory outhorities to design on

investment os well os provide on o
regulor bosis published stotements

octivities.

oppropriote fromework for
efficient doto collection, ond

mqnogement

of

informotion on

the exposures ond

f

unding

dependency of the mojor bonks to
non-bonk finonciol sectors os well
os moteriol individuol positions. lt
theref ore behooves on the

of more doto on securities lending
ond repo exposures omong lorge
internotionol finonciol institutions
ore treoted with urgency.

ln order to copture ond curtoil the
incessont octivities of shodow
bonks ond its further escolotion of
systemic risk in Nigerio, oppropriote

mechonism os well os regulotory

fromeworks

for the

shodow

bonking system needs to be in
ploce. All big firms ond finonciol

their finonciol tronsoctions ond

with detoiled informotion on how
much colloterol they hove, ond
whot it is used for. The Centrol Bonk
of Nigerio, ond other regulotors in
the finonciol servicei industry
should shengthen its regulotory
oversight, ensure thot oppiopriote
monitoring ond supervision' is in
ptoce while ensuring thot collotion
68
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noted on the rodor of

this

fromework for efficient doto
collection, ond inf ormotion
monogement system os well os
keying in into FSB's globol
strotegies. lt is instructive thot when

monoged properly, shodow
bonks' liquidity ond moturity

profiles do not pose significont risks
to the finonciol system. lndeed, it is

not necessorily o

conclusion

thot the

foregone
increosed

importonce of shodow bonks
weokens the effectiveness of
monetory policy; it moy chonge

the relotive importonce

of
individuol tronsmission chonnels
ond increose the effectiveness of
monetory policy meosures in on
economy. Shodow bonking offers

voluoble olternotive to
conventionol bonking system with
increosing coresponding risks to
the finonciol system. lt is prone to

both type

I ond type ll

errors.

Effective policy implementotion of
the system is o chollenge becouse
of its elusiveness; ond os regulotors

try to identify ond control
porticulor shodow bonkingo

ggliyitv, the sysrem is innovotivefi

rnrllotrng onother.
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